Two generations of education on science and evolution would seem a logical long-term solution give Arab and Jewish children a real science education in a way that does not offend Islam or Judaism. A draft self paced online course aimed more at Christian students. Evolution for students. Appeal to the hearts and minds rather than trying to hurt the body. The current approach is just making it worse. Religion is a root cause of a lot of the hatred! To change “them”, you must work on yourselves first. Being devout and orthodox does not exclude you being a student of modern science seeking justice and humanity for all people. Green candidate facing lies and abuse from the ALP, the Greens might take legal action against the ALP for defamation for being labelled as Anti-Semetic for supporting a boycott of Israel. If you in any way criticise Israel political policy of human rights violations, you are accused and labelled as being antisemitic by Zionists like Michael Danby and the Anti-Defamation Commission ADC
“So this is how it works when advocating for Palestinian human rights. You’ll be smeared, accused of anti-Semitism and told you hate Jews. Anything to avoid discussion about what Israel is doing to the Palestinians! Apartheid.”
“The Zionist lobby and local Jewish community during the election has revealed that they are willing to allow smears and violent actions against the Greens”. Parker hoped progressive Jews he knew would condemn the offensive comparison. They did not. These Jews provide cover for extreme actions if they occur. If there is a sniff of you being critical of Israel, such Jews will attack you and cut you loose. Parker is now fed up with what he sees as Jewish silence. “.
“There is no difference between Tehreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and MQM because both are sponsored by India and USA. Sawat type operation against MQM’s ‘Clean Shaven Taliban’ who are supporting Blackwater/Xe is a must because people will support. President Zardari, the ‘Putin of Pakistan’ can he do anything of for Karachi or he has become a cuddly toy now?”They targeted a Sunni areas where it is almost impossible for an angry ‘Shia protestor’ to reach from the crime scene keeping in the view the distances. So Shia procession was bombed, Sunni business were burnt down and MQM’s fire engines did not arrive. Seems perfect Blackwater Inc style operation?
The recent bombings of a religious procession in Karachi and fire bombings of small businesses miles away from the incident reportedly owned by mostly Sunni Tableghie Jamat a non violent religious group, got all the hall marks of ‘private mercenaries’ Blackwater with the support of MQM. According to reports it is physically not possible for any one attending the procession to go miles away, get special fire bombing chemicals and equipment to set fire 300 hundred shops in Bolton Market. It is only possible if one already knows the timing of the bombings and part of the plot.
Blackwater, MQM’s Plus plan was meticulous and well timed. (a) Timing of the bombing few days before the end of the term of City Government Term. So City Government building burnt down with the record to cover-up corruption? (b) Selection of the venues to be fire bombed (c) Torching of Light House Market predominantly owned by the Pashtuns who did not pay extortion money to the MQM –
According to sources similar kinds of chemicals and fire bombing equipments have been used in Iraq and Lebanon. Pakistan’s security agencies must look into the links between MQM lead City Government and Blackwater. What kind of assistance they are providing to the mercenaries. City mayor Syed Mustafa Kamal and Governor Sind Dr Ashrat Abad Khan recently visited sensitive institutions of the USA related to protection of US national interests aboard. Why would a mayor of a third world country visit US State Department? Did he inform Pakistani’s foreign ministry? He is on the grooming list. “To his credentials it was Mustafa Kamal who opened the door for the assassins came to kill his ‘uncle’ Azeem Ahmed Tariq, leader of the MQM, as it was an inside job. It sounds like nephew shopped his ‘uncle’ according to Score settled, Job done. Torching of Bolton Market mostly business are owned by peaceful Sunni Muslims Memon Community. They refused to be relocated outside the city because shops worth millions. High ups of the current regime allegedly President Zardari & Co had interest in the land to develop and build flats and plazas. (Job done) (e) Why MQM leaders both reportedly Shias Haider Abbas Rizvi and Faisal Sabzwari not in the Ashura procession? (f) Why police and rangers did not stop the arsonists and terrorists? (g) ambulance which might be carrying a head too? (i) Who ordered them not to act? (h) Remote control bomb was planted in an ambulance which might be carrying a head too? Who is Hasham Al-Zafar (central) and what is his role in the bombing and burning of Karachi? (j) What is his relationship with Saleem Shezad alleged master mind of the operation and why he only reports to Altaf Hussain? The al Qaida Chief gave money to Nawaz Sharif after obtaining assurance from him that he would make Pakistan a complete Islamic state. Khawaja also claimed that Nawaz Sharif had met leaders of Islamic movements around the world. Osama also arranged a meeting for Nawaz Sharif with the Saudi royal family. “During his first visit to Saudi Arabia as chief minister of Punjab in the late 1980s, no one from the royal family gave Nawaz importance,” he said. “Thereafter, on Nawaz’s request, Osama introduced him to the royal family,” said Khwaja. “A close aide of the Sharif family and I arranged at least five meetings between Nawaz and Osama in Saudi Arabia.”
The Daily Times came up with another report on March 23, 2010, saying a Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif suggested that Talibanwork outa “separate peace” with Punjab province. Shahbaz’s rabid suggestion was “Cease targeting Punjab” and focus on the other three provinces. The comment triggered off a nation-wide furore. “Kayani summoned him and upbraided him in language he won’t soon forget. But this didn’t deter Nawaz Sharif from bragging about his ‘old friendship’ with Osama bin Laden,” the Pakistani newspaper said. Nawaz Sharif’s linkages with Osama bin Laden had rankled former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto too and she had discussed this with George Bush Senior in 1989, Zardari told an American channel recently.
The Pakistani government has given a one-week deadline to the country’s intelligence services to identify and apprehend members of the notorious American security firm Blackwater (currently known as Xe Services LLC) in Pakistan.
The deadline was issued following intelligence reports about the ongoing presence of Blackwater agents on Pakistani soil.
According to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Blackwater agents are still operating in the country.
The Xe Services operatives were reportedly involved in the assassination of senior leader of Haqqani terrorist network Nasiruddin Haqqani on the outskirts of Islamabad..
Nasiruddin was the son of Jalaluddin Haqqani, the leader of Pakistan-based Haqqani militant network.
President Karzai of Afghanistan warned Bhutto that his intelligence service had learned of threats against her life. Informers had told the Afghans of a meeting of army commanders — Musharraf and his 10 most-powerful generals — in which they discussed a militant plot to have Bhutto killed.
In late December, a group of militants, including two teenage boys trained and primed to commit suicide bombings, arrived at the Haqqania madrasa in the northwestern town of Akora Khattak.
The madrasa is a notorious establishment, housing 3,000 students in large, whitewashed residence blocks. Ninety-five percent of the Taliban fighting in Afghanistan have passed through its classrooms, a spokesman for the madrasa proudly told me. Its most famous graduate is Jalaluddin Haqqani, a veteran Afghan mujahedeen commander whose network has become the main instrument for ISI-directed attacks in Kabul and eastern Afghanistan.
The two young visitors who stopped for a night at the madrasa were escorted the next day to Rawalpindi, where Bhutto would be speaking at a rally on Dec. 27. As her motorcade left the rally, it slowed so she could greet supporters in the street. One of the two teenagers fired a pistol at her and then detonated his vest of explosives. Bhutto was standing in the roof opening of an armored S.U.V. She ducked into the vehicle at the sound of the gunfire, but the explosion threw the S.U.V. forward, slamming the edge of the roof hatch into the back of her head with lethal force. Bhutto slumped down into the vehicle, mortally wounded, and fell into the lap of her confidante and constant chaperone, Naheed Khan.
Ali had no doubts that the mastermind of the plot to kill Bhutto was Al Qaeda. “It was because she was pro-American, because she was a strong leader and a nationalist,” he told me.
A Pakistani security official who interviewed some of the suspects in the Bhutto case and other militants detained in Pakistan’s prisons came to the same conclusion. The decision to assassinate Bhutto was made at a meeting of the top council of Al Qaeda, the official said.
It took more than three years before the depth of Pakistan’s relationship with Al Qaeda was thrust into the open and the world learned where Bin Laden had been hiding, just a few hundred yards from Pakistan’s top military academy.
In May 2011, I drove with a Pakistani colleague down a road in Abbottabad until we were stopped by the Pakistani military. We left our car and walked down a side street, past several walled houses and then along a dirt path until there it was: Osama bin Laden’s house, a three-story concrete building, mostly concealed behind concrete walls as high as 18 feet, topped with rusting strands of barbed wire. This was where Bin Laden hid for nearly six years, and where, 30 hours earlier, Navy SEAL commandos shot him dead in a top-floor bedroom.
After a decade of reporting in Afghanistan and Pakistan and tracking Bin Laden, I was fascinated to see where and how he hid. He had dispensed with the large entourage that surrounded him in Afghanistan. For nearly eight years, he relied on just two trusted Pakistanis, whom American investigators described as a courier and his brother.
People knew that the house was strange, and one local rumor had it that it was a place where wounded Taliban from Waziristan recuperated. I was told this by Musharraf’s former civilian intelligence chief, who had himself been accused of having a hand in hiding Bin Laden in Abbottabad. He denied any involvement, but he did not absolve local intelligence agents, who would have checked the house.
All over the country, Pakistan’s various intelligence agencies — the ISI, the Intelligence Bureau and Military Intelligence — keep safe houses for undercover operations. They use residential houses, often in quiet, secure neighborhoods, where they lodge people for interrogation or simply enforced seclusion. Detainees have been questioned by American interrogators in such places and sometimes held for months. Leaders of banned militant groups are often placed in protective custody in this way.
Others, including Taliban leaders who took refuge in Pakistan after their fall in Afghanistan in 2001, lived under a looser arrangement, with their own guards but also known to their Pakistani handlers. Because of Pakistan’s long practice of covertly supporting militant groups, police officers — who have been warned off or even demoted for getting in the way of ISI operations — have learned to leave such safe houses alone.
The split over how to handle militants is not just between the ISI and the local police; the intelligence service itself is compartmentalized. In 2007, a former senior intelligence official who worked on tracking members of Al Qaeda after Sept. 11 told me that while one part of the ISI was engaged in hunting down militants, another part continued to work with them.
Soon after the Navy SEAL raid on Bin Laden’s house, a Pakistani official told me that the United States had direct evidence that the ISI chief, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, knew of Bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad. The information came from a senior United States official, and I guessed that the Americans had intercepted a phone call of Pasha’s or one about him in the days after the raid. “He knew of Osama’s whereabouts, yes,” the Pakistani official told me.
The official was surprised to learn this and said the Americans were even more so. Pasha had been an energetic opponent of the Taliban and an open and cooperative counterpart for the Americans at the ISI. Pasha was always their blue-eyed boy. But in the weeks and months after the raid, Pasha and the ISI press office strenuously denied that they had any knowledge of Bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad.
Colleagues at The Times began questioning officials in Washington about which high-ranking officials in Pakistan might also have been aware of Bin Laden’s whereabouts, but everyone suddenly clammed up. It was as if a decision had been made to contain the damage to the relationship between the two governments. “There’s no smoking gun,” officials in the Obama administration began to say.
The haul of handwritten notes, letters, computer files and other information collected from Bin Laden’s house during the raid suggested otherwise, however.
It revealed regular correspondence between Bin Laden and a string of militant leaders who must have known he was living in Pakistan, including Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, the founder of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a pro-Kashmiri group that has also been active in Afghanistan, and Mullah Omar of the Taliban.
Saeed and Omar are two of the ISI’s most important and loyal militant leaders. Both are protected by the agency. Both cooperate closely with it, restraining their followers from attacking the Pakistani state and coordinating with Pakistan’s greater strategic plans. Any correspondence the two men had with Bin Laden would probably have been known to their ISI handlers.
Bin Laden did not rely only on correspondence. He occasionally traveled to meet aides and fellow militants, one Pakistani security official told me. “Osama was moving around,” he said, adding that he heard so from jihadi sources. “You cannot run a movement without contact with people.” Bin Laden traveled in plain sight, his convoys always knowingly waved through any security checkpoints.
In 2009, Bin Laden reportedly traveled to Pakistan’s tribal areas to meet with themilitant leader Qari Saifullah Akhtar. Informally referred to as the “father of jihad,” Akhtar is considered one of the ISI’s most valuable assets.
According to a Pakistani intelligence source, he was the commander accused of trying to kill Bhutto on her return in 2007, and he is credited with driving Mullah Omar out of Afghanistan on the back of a motorbike in 2001 and moving Bin Laden out of harm’s way just minutes before American missile strikes on his camp in 1998. After the Sept. 11 attacks, he was detained several times in Pakistan. Yet he was never prosecuted and was quietly released each time by the ISI.
At his meeting with Bin Laden in August 2009, Akhtar is reported to have requested Al Qaeda’s help in mounting an attack on the Pakistani army headquarters in Rawalpindi. Intelligence officials learned about the meeting later that year from interrogations of men involved in the attack. Information on the meeting was compiled in a report seen by all of the civilian and military intelligence agencies, security officials at the Interior Ministry and American counterterrorism officials.
At the meeting, Bin Laden rejected Akhtar’s request for help and urged him and other militant groups not to fight Pakistan but to serve the greater cause — the jihad against America. He warned against fighting inside Pakistan because it would destroy their home base: “If you make a hole in the ship, the whole ship will go down,” he said.
He wanted Akhtar and the Taliban to accelerate the recruitment and training of fighters so they could trap United States forces in Afghanistan with a well-organized guerrilla war. Bin Laden said that Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and the Indian Ocean region would be Al Qaeda’s main battlefields in the coming years, and that he needed more fighters from those areas. He even offered naval training for militants, saying that the United States would soon exit Afghanistan and that the next war would be waged on the seas.
Akhtar, in his mid-50s, remains at large in Pakistan. He is still active in jihadi circles and in running madrasas — an example of a militant commander whom the ISI has struggled to control yet is too valuable for them to lock up or eliminate.
In trying to prove that the ISI knew of Bin Laden’s whereabouts and protected him, I struggled for more than two years to piece together something other than circumstantial evidence and suppositions from sources with no direct knowledge.
Only one man, a former ISI chief and retired general, Ziauddin Butt, told me that he thought Musharraf had arranged to hide Bin Laden in Abbottabad. But he had no proof and, under pressure, claimed in the Pakistan been misunderstood.
Finally, on a winter evening in 2012, I got the confirmation I was looking for. According to one inside source, the ISI actually ran a special desk assigned to handle Bin Laden. It was operated independently, led by an officer who made his own decisions and did not report to a superior. He handled only one person: Bin Laden. I was sitting at an outdoor cafe when I learned this, and I remember gasping, though quietly so as not to draw attention. (Two former senior American officials later told me that the information was consistent with their own conclusions.) This was what Afghans knew, and Taliban fighters had told me, but finally someone on the inside was admitting it. The desk was wholly deniable by virtually everyone at the ISI — such is how supersecret intelligence units operate — but the top military bosses knew about it, I was told.
America’s failure to fully understand and actively confront Pakistan on its support and export of terrorism is one of the primary reasons President Karzai has become so disillusioned with the United States.
As American and NATO troops prepare to withdraw from Afghanistan by the end of this year, the Pakistani military and its Taliban proxy forces lie in wait, as much a threat as any that existed in 2001.
In January 2013, I visited the Haqqania madrasa to speak with senior clerics about the graduates they were dispatching to Afghanistan. They agreed to let me interview them and gave the usual patter about it being each person’s individual choice to wage jihad. But there was also continuing fanatical support for the Taliban. “Those who are against the Taliban, they are the liberals, and they only represent 5 percent of Afghans,” the spokesman for the madrasa told me. He and his fellow clerics were set on a military victory for the Taliban in Afghanistan. Moreover, he said, “it is a political fact that one day the Taliban will take power. The white flag of the Taliban will fly again over Kabul, inshallah.”
Pakistani security officials, political analysts, journalists and legislators warned of the same thing. The Pakistani military was still set on dominating Afghanistan and was still determined to use the Taliban to exert influence now that the United States was pulling out.
Kathy Gannon of The Associated Press reported in September that militants from Punjab were massing in the tribal areas to join the Taliban and train for an anticipated offensive into Afghanistan this year. In Punjab, mainstream religious parties and banned militant groups were openly recruiting hundreds of students for jihad, and groups of young men were being dispatched to Syria to wage jihad there. “They are the same jihadi groups; they are not 100 percent under control,” a former Pakistani legislator told me. “But still the military protects them.”
The United States was neither speaking out against Pakistan nor changing its policy toward a government that was exporting terrorism, the legislator lamented. “How many people have to die before they get it? They are standing by a military that protects, aids and abets people who are going against the U.S. and Western mission in Afghanistan, in Syria, everywhere.”
When I remember the beleaguered state of Afghanistan in 2001, I marvel at the changes the American intervention has fostered: the rebuilding, the modernity, the bright graduates in every office. Yet after 13 years, more than a trillion dollars spent, 120,000 foreign troops deployed at the height of the war and tens of thousands of lives lost, Afghanistan’s predicament has not changed: It remains a weak state, prey to the ambitions of its neighbors and extremist Islamists. This is perhaps an unpopular opinion, but to pull out now is, undeniably, to leave with the job only half-done.
When President Zardari speak about ‘non state & political actors’, probably he also meant Altaf Hussain too? His long distance proactive and dramatic telephonic speeches are more or less what Lord Nelson said, “If you can’t baffle them with brilliance, dazzle them with bullshit!”. He is never been to Pakistan for more then 15 years but did travel to India on his British passport. Most of the members in mafia style ‘Rabita Committee’ are wanted by Pakistani authorities for heinous crimes. He hides behind this ‘kangaroo committee’.
A political analyst said, ‘to get ‘poodle status’ in US administration Altaf Hussain exaggerates things beyond imagination. For example, he claimed his supporters in Karachi increased by 10 million in just two years because he claimed to have 20 million supporters in an interview with Edgware Times in November 1998. But in 2001 MQM claimed to have 30 million supporters when MQM send a fax to Reuters on 22 September 2001. “(MQM leader) Altaf Hussain has offered the unconditional support of over 30 million MQM supporters to the U.S. president and the international community,” its London-based international secretariat said in a statement faxed to Reuters on September 22, 2001”.
“There is no difference between Tehreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and MQM because both are sponsored by India and USA. Sawat type operation against MQM’s ‘Clean Shaven Taliban’ who are supporting Blackwater/Xe is a must because people will support. President Zardari, the ‘Putin of Pakistan’ can he do anything of for Karachi or he has become a cuddly toy now?”
(Dr Shahid Qureshi is award winning journalist and writer on foreign policy & security based in London)